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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
on its books and certify to him the shares of stock so seized. Held, that the
seizure of the certificates in England divested Pilger of title to the shares.
Pilger v. United States Steel Corporation (N. J. Ch., 1928), 141 A. 737.
The principal case is in accord with a recent Supreme Court decision in
a case involving similar facts. Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft V. U. S.
Steel Corp. (1924), 267 U. S. 22, 69 L. Ed. 495, 45 S. Ct. 207. The factual
set-up is not a usual one, but the case is analogous to those in which it is
sought by levy to attach the interest represented by stock certificates. At
common law, shares of stock in a corporation were not subject to levy and
sale on execution. Foster v. Potter (1866), 37 Mo. 525. The reason given
was that "to 'levy' means to seize. It follows that what cannot be taken
corporeally, cannot be levied on." Haley v. Reid (1854), 16 Ga. 437. The
interest of the shareholder was said to be an invisible and intangible thing.
At present, however, statutes generally permit levy upon an attachment of
stock. Cook, CORPORATIONS (8th Ed.), Sec. 482. Since a thing can be
seized only where it is, the cases turn on the situs of the shares in the cor-
poration. It is generally held that the situs of a share, "considered as prop-
erty separated from its owner" is at the domicil of the corporation. Cook,
CORPORATIONS (8th Ed.), Sec. 485. Armour Bros. Banking Co. v. St. Louis
Nat. Bank (1892), 113 Mo. 12, 20 S. W. 690. Hence, courts permit levy to
be made by process served on the corporation at its domicil. Barber 'V.
Morgan (1911), 84 Conn. 618, 80 A. 791, Ann. Cas. 1912D 951. It is often
held that shares can be attached only in the state creating the corporation.
See Smith v. Downey (1893), 8 Ind. App. 179, 34 N. E. 823, 52 Am. St. Rep.
467; Christmas v. Biddle (1850), 13 Pa. St. 223; Armour Bros. Banking Co.
v. St. Louis Nat. Bank, supra. In these cases, the certificates of foreign
corporations were in the state and within the jurisdiction of the court. In
Christmas v. Biddle, supra, the court said that seizure of the certificates is
as ineffective in attaching the share as a levy upon title deeds in attach-
ment of land in another state. This view is based on the conception that
certificates are muniments of title and merely evidence of the ownership of
a share in the corporation. The modern business view, however, is that a
certificate of stock is property in itself, and is, practically speaking, the
stock itself. Cook, CORPORATIONS (8th Ed.), Sec. 485; Simpson v. Jersey
City Contracting Co. (1900), 165 N. Y. 193, 58 N. E. 896, 55 L. R. A. 796.
As a result the modern trend of the courts is to permit levy upon a share
of stock by attachment of the certificate, although the domicil of the cor-
poration is in another state. Simpson v. Jersey City Contracting Co., supra.
Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. U. S. Steel Corp., supra. In the
latter case, it was said that the question of title depended on the law
of the place where the paper is (at least in cases where the certificate is, by
the law of the domicil of the corporation, transferable in blank). The prin-
cipal case is in accord with this modern doctrine. J. N., '29.
CRI mINAL LAw-CONsTRUCTIVE PRESENCE OF PRINcIPAL-Where a burg-
lary is committed pursuant to a conspiracy, one of the conspirators, located
at a considerable distance from the place burglarized, is nevertheless guilty
as a principal, if his location was for the purpose of accomplishing some-
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thing to make the burglary possible, since he would be constructively pres-
ent. State v. James (1928), 165 La. 822, 116 So. 199.
The facts of this case are not given in the report; but if its language is
to be believed it goes farther than the ordinary cases of constructive pres-
ence in which the accused has acted in aiding the accomplishment of the
crime; in the principal case the accused is held where he has been a party
to a comspiracy, but has gone no farther than appearing in a location with
the unexpected purpose of assisting in the perpetration of the crime.
Under the rules of the common law, for one to be guilty as a principal in
the second degree it is necessary that he shall have been present at the com-
mission of the crime. But this presence need not be actual; it may be con-
structive. Clark, CRIMINAL LAW, p. 112. Ordinarily the accused is held if,
contemporaneously, he has acted in aid of the felony, although not actually
present. State v. Talley (1893), 102 Ala. 25, 15 So. 722; Knight v. State
(1924), 165 Ark. 226, 263 S. W. 782. Common methods which would render
the accused constructively present are keeping watch, giving information,
preventing warning, and leaving a post of duty in order to facilitate the
commission of the offense. In People v. McCourtney (1923), 307 Ill. 441,
18 N. E. 857, it was held that one who acts as a lookout and assists in an
attempted burglary is a principal in the commission of the crime.
In support of the principal case the accused has been held as a principal
where he is so situated when the crime is committed as to be able to assist
in its commission. U. S. v. Boyd (1890), 45 F. 851; Gilbert v. State (1916)
79 Tex. Cr. 523, 186 S. W. 324.
But the mere fact that one is a party to a conspiracy to commit a felony
does not in itself show constructive presence. Barnett v. State (1904), 46
Tex. Cr. 459, 805 S. W. 1013; Carey v. State (1924), 194 Ind. 626, 144
N. E. 22. Nor will the mere presence of a person be sufficient to constitute
him a principal, unless there is something in his conduct showing a design
to encourage, incite, or in some manner aid, abet, or assist the actual per-
petration of the crime. People v. Barnes (1924), 311 Ill. 559, 143 N. E.
445.
In Commonwealth v. Knapp (1830), 9 Pickering (Mass.) 496, 20 Am.
Dec. 491, it was held that if a conspirator be in a situation to assist the
perpetrator at the time the crime was committed, the burden is on the con-
spirator to rebut the presumption that he was then to carry into effect the
concerted crime.
It is thus to be inferred that it is sufficient that the accused was so sit-
uated as to aid in the commission of the crime and had merely formed the
purpose of assisting in the crime. No act on his part is necessary to hold
him as a principal where his location coincides with a purpose of as-
sistance. S. E., '30.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ToRT LIABILITY-CONDUCT OF PARKs.-Plain-
tiffs sue city of Waco, Texas, for own benefit and as best friend, for minor
daughter, who was injured when a municipal park employee negligently
blocked the road while she was riding in a car on one of the driveways of
Cameron Park in defendant city. Held, that maintenance of a public park
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